Assessing the Threat of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs

I. Introduction

On October 23, 2003, the Philippine police were in the final stages of capturing one of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah’s (AJAI) finance officers, Taufik Rifki (a.k.a. Abu Ubaidah), at his safe house in Cotabato City, Mindanao. After apprehending Rifki, the police began searching his safe house for evidence. They were stunned by what they discovered—a chemical and biological manual.[^1^] After this discovery, the police realized that Rifki was more than just a young AJAI operative from Indonesia in charge of the organization’s financial supply in the Mindanao area.[^2^] Subsequent interrogations revealed that Rifki was an AJAI military academy graduate who had learned directly from the late and infamous Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi. Al-Ghozi was one of AJAI’s top bomb makers and was even sought out by al-Qaeda to train its operatives.[^3^]

The discovery of AJAI’s chemical and biological manual not only shocked officials in the Philippines but also various countries in the region where AJAI operates, particularly Indonesia, which is the epicenter of AJAI’s activities. Given that AJAI is “the deadliest terrorist organization in Southeast Asia,” AJAI’s control of chemical and biological weapons would logically make this group even more perilous.[^4^] Furthermore, the finding of the manual inevitably raises several concerns and questions. As an organization that seeks to establish a pan-Islamic state with the help of popular support, what are its justifications for producing or even using such weapons? What are its motivations or intentions? Does intent equal capability? Moreover, what capabilities does AJAI possess to produce such weapons? This paper will attempt to answer these questions by examining the history, objectives, and evolution of AJAI, and will address its motivation and capabilities.

II. Brief History, Objectives, and Evolution of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah (AJAI)

Before examining the history, objectives, and evolution of AJAI, it is important to properly address the name of the organization. The proper and correct name of the organization is al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah, not Jemaah Islamiyah. The words Jemaah Islamiyah grammatically refer to and translate into the whole Muslim community (ummah), while the word ‘al’ according to Arabic grammar specifies the word that comes after. Thus, the words al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah refer only to a specific group within the Muslim ummah. In this case, it refers to an organization within the Muslim ummah that seeks to establish a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia through various means.[^5^]

Examining the history and evolution of AJAI is crucial for two reasons. First, understanding the group’s history and evolution is essential, especially in light of the possibility that the group is planning to produce chemical and biological weapons. Second, experts who claim to be knowledgeable about terrorism in Southeast Asia often lack an understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, cultures, languages, and access to primary sources. For instance, Zachary Abuza states (without mentioning his source) that Abdullah Sungkar (one of the founders of AJAI) in the early 1990s “pledged bayat, a form of allegiance, to [Usama] bin Laden.”[^6^] In-depth examination reveals that this would be unlikely due to religious and traditional positions against such an act. More specifically, Sungkar, who had already reached the level of both hafiz (one who has completely memorized the Holy Koran) and da’i (preacher), had superior knowledge regarding Islamic jurisprudence compared to the relatively young bin Laden. Hence, such bayat could not happen from a religious standpoint. Moreover, Nasir Abas, one of AJAI’s former military academy instructors in Afghanistan, asserts that it was bin Laden’s mentor, Abdullah Azzam, for whom the AJAI leaders and operatives had profound respect.[^7^] Today, the bayat in AJAI does not mention bin Laden’s name but rather the name of Sungkar (when he was alive) and now Bashir.[^8^]

AJAI historically descended from another organization, Darul Islam (House of Islam), which was established in 1942 by Kartosuwiryo. Darul Islam was a public and Islamic organization whose main goal was to liberate Indonesia from colonial powers and create an Islamic State of Indonesia. However, the organization was challenged and crushed by the secular Indonesian government. Kartosuwiryo was captured and sentenced to death in 1962. Shortly after his death, the organization began to dissipate or go underground.[^9^] Approximately 30 years later, two Indonesian preachers, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who were evading the authorities, decided to revive the Darul Islam movement. The preachers, who shared many of Kartosuwiryo’s ideals and visions, decided to establish a new organization, AJAI, which was designed to be secretive and have greater ambitions than Darul Islam.[^10^]

Sungkar and Bashir learned from Darul Islam’s mistakes that an open struggle for an Islamic state would be met with fierce opposition by the secular government of Indonesia. They were determined to succeed and be greater visionaries than Kartosuwiryo. Their ultimate objective was to create a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia, rather than only focusing on the creation of an Islamic state of Indonesia. Therefore, they decided to secede from Darul Islam and establish the secretive (sirri) AJAI.[^11^]

The five practical methods outlined in AJAI’s guidelines, PUPJI, are believed to help achieve its ultimate goal. The five methods are dawah (calling to Islam), tarbiyah (education), amar ma’ruf nahi ‘anil mungkar (enjoin good and forbid evil), hijrah (move to a better or more secure place), and jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the way of Allah). Additionally, AJAI advocates salafism. AJAI believes that the best time and example of the Muslim ummah occurred during the ruling of Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his righteous predecessors in Medina. AJAI strives to revive the practice of Islam during that period, while its operatives strive to emulate those righteous predecessors. Moreover, PUPJI requires that all AJAI operatives maintain a high level of secrecy (sirri) in every aspect of their operations.[^12^]

Within the first seven years after its inception in 1993, AJAI appeared to be a non-violent, secretive organization that relied on peaceful means to achieve its ultimate goal. During this period, it was evident that AJAI placed more emphasis on the first four practical methods previously mentioned. Furthermore, it was apparent that AJAI focused on establishing economic and logistical network supports in three regions (mantiqis). AJAI did this to place support networks that would sustain the organization over time.[^13^] Mantiqis (or AJAI’s regional divisions) are quintessential areas of operations that had been carefully selected to support the organization.[^14^]

Mantiqi 1 covers Malaysia and Singapore. Due to the vast economic activity, this mantiqi is designed to be the main source of AJAI’s income. AJAI receives vast donations and contributions from its members or sympathizers who work in this mantiqi compared to the other mantiqis.[^15^] More importantly, there are many businesses run by AJAI in this mantiqi that contribute 10 percent of their total earnings to the organization.[^16^] Mantiqi 1 was initially headed by Hambali (who has close ties with al-Qaeda) and later by Mukhlas (the mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombing).[^17^] It is also important to note that because of its strategic location, the head of this mantiqi often serves as AJAI’s ambassador. In other words, the head of this mantiqi is often assigned to establish (or maintain) relationships with other Islamist organizations abroad.[^18^]

Mantiqi 2 covers a little less than two-thirds of Indonesia, excluding Borneo and Papua. This mantiqi is designed as the recruiting region for AJAI.[^19^] It is primarily because within this mantiqi, especially the island of Java, there are countless numbers of both traditional and modern religious institutions. It is also important to note that AJAI’s current leader, Bashir, has his pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding school) al-Mukmin located in this mantiqi. Moreover, mantiqi 2 is intrinsically the main recruiting region for AJAI. This mantiqi was initially headed by Abu Fateh and later by Nuaim, who graduated from AJAI’s military academy in Afghanistan.[^21^]

Mantiqi 3 covers several parts of East Indonesia, Sabah, and the southern Philippines. This mantiqi is designed as the training location for AJAI operatives. In fact, AJAI’s second military academy—Hudaybiyah military academy—which operated from 1994 to 2000, is located in this region.[^22^] It is important to note that the land for Hudaybiyah military academy was given by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) partly as a token of appreciation for AJAI’s training of MILF operatives.[^23^] Moreover, Taufik Rifki, one of AJAI’s finance officers who was arrested in Mindanao and possessed a biological and chemical warfare manual, received “financial and other support” from MILF.[^24^] These examples demonstrate the close relationship between AJAI and MILF. Furthermore, the head of this mantiqi was Mustapha and later Nasir Abas, a top instructor at AJAI’s military academy who had trained MILF operatives.[^25^]

With the fall of Suharto’s military rule in May of 1998, AJAI began to shift toward violent means to achieve its ultimate goal. Suharto was notorious for his harsh measures against any movement or individual he perceived to be a threat to his regime. During Suharto’s regime, Sungkar and Bashir, who preached about the creation of an Islamic state of Indonesia, were hunted and forced to escape to Malaysia.[^26^] The fall of Suharto allowed Sungkar and Bashir, as well as other top AJAI operatives, to return to Indonesia. Once they returned, they began to preach about the need to establish a pan-Islamic state starting from the largest Muslim country in Southeast Asia (and in the world)—Indonesia. Through public lectures or sermons about the need to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia, they began to influence and change public perception.

The socioeconomic and political conditions post-Suharto’s regime were conducive for Islamist ideology to thrive. Along with the fall of Suharto, the Indonesian economy and security went into a state of chaos. Since his regime was mainly responsible for the economic crisis, it demonstrated another failure of secular ruling in promoting social welfare in Indonesia. Consequently, Indonesian Muslims became more receptive to the idea of establishing an Islamic state of Indonesia. They could then emulate the righteous predecessors, as the majority of Muslims consider the era of those predecessors as the golden era of Islam. AJAI understood this social change and decided to exploit this opportunity to advance its goal. AJAI operatives continued to persuade Muslims who were unhappy with the Indonesian socioeconomic conditions and Muslims who shared AJAI’s goal to join the organization. Moreover, the fall of Suharto’s military rule created a power vacuum, allowing AJAI’s operatives to move freely in Indonesia.

At the end of 1999, Abdullah Sungkar died and was replaced by Abu Bakar Bashir. However, Bashir was not elected by consensus, and some of AJAI’s operatives—particularly the more militant, radical, and younger ones—were reluctant to support Bashir. They considered Bashir to be weak and insufficiently radical.[^27^] Nevertheless, they did not have a choice, and they were afraid that their differences could lead to the collapse of the movement. After compromising to prevent the movement from collapsing, they secretly began to distance themselves from AJAI’s leadership. They began to express more radical ideologies outside of AJAI, one of which was al-Qaedaism.[^28^]

The rift within AJAI worsened when Bashir decided to be the emir of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in 2000 in addition to his position as the emir of AJAI.[^29^] According to the more radical members, the concept of MMI diverged from Sungkar’s strategy that AJAI should remain underground and secretive until the organization is well-established. Bashir, on the other hand, believed that the fall of Suharto represented an opportunity for all Muslim groups in Indonesia, including AJAI, to participate in Indonesian politics and contribute to the change.[^30^] While Bashir gradually became open to the public, the radicals maintained their secretive nature. Some important radicals include Zulkarnaen, Hambali, Imam Samudra, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Dr. Azhari, and Nurdin M. Top. Although the radicals continued to respect Bashir as the de jure head of AJAI, they secretly began to search for a new leader closer to their way of thinking.[^31^] The leader to whom most AJAI radicals looked was the leader of the global salafi jihadist movement, Usama bin Laden.[^32^]

It is worth noting that since the late 1990s, bin Laden had firmly established his position as one of the key players in the international salafi jihadist movement. Bin Laden’s rise to prominence occurred due to the expansion of his al-Qaeda networks worldwide and his robust (which many Muslims consider to be heroic) opposition against the West and corrupt Muslim regimes.

Furthermore, Bashir’s decision to head two organizations inevitably reduced his influence and control within AJAI. Managing two large organizations made him unable to oversee all of AJAI’s operations. Hence, he relied more on his private assistants (amir of Markaziyah) and especially the heads of mantiqis to run AJAI. Consequently, his private assistants and the heads of the mantiqis became more dominant than they had been.[^33^] The problem was that his assistant and the heads of the mantiqis, especially mantiqi 1 under the leadership of Hambali, had been increasingly influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology. Al-Qaeda’s ideology advocates violence in establishing an Islamic state. This is primarily because al-Qaeda’s top leaders believe that western powers (mainly the U.S.), non-Muslims, and corrupt Muslim leaders seek to destroy Islam. Moreover, to establish a true Islamic community, they must be confronted with force. Hambali, in particular, began to be influenced more and more by al-Qaeda’s ideology partly because of his role as an ambassador of AJAI. This position allowed him to have frequent contacts and exchanges of opinions with al-Qaeda operatives, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad.[^34^]

Soon thereafter, Hambali and his subordinates began to spread their radical ideology not only within mantiqi 1 but also to other mantiqis, thereby creating a pro al-Qaeda faction across mantiqis. This was the main reason why Hambali was capable of carrying out coordinated attacks outside his mantiqi (jurisdiction), such as bombing various churches across Indonesia, and was able to get away with his crimes without repercussions from the other AJAI mantiqi leaders. After 2000, it was apparent that Hambali became the most dominant leader of all the mantiqis. Hambali controlled the main sources of funding for AJAI and was also in command of many radicals within AJAI. His control of the mantiqis and many radicals allowed him to further exert his pro-al-Qaeda ideology across the three mantiqis.[^35^]

Today, the existence and the spread of al-Qaeda’s ideology within AJAI are irrefutable. By simply comparing public announcements, books, and videos made by al-Qaeda’s leaders and AJAI’s top operatives, one could make a strong argument that they are identical except that one is delivered in Arabic, while the other is in Bahasa. Similarities between al-Qaeda’s leaders and AJAI’s top operatives range from viewing jihad as a personal obligation and the only way to achieve glory for Muslims, to quoting the same verses, to declaring war against the crusaders and Jews, to calling Muslims to kill enemies of Islam anywhere they can be found, to justifying the killing of civilians and suicide bombings, to claiming that they are the defenders of the ummah.[^36^]

The pro-al-Qaeda faction within AJAI is the most dangerous faction within the organization. It is mainly because it advocates violence and terrorism to achieve AJAI’s ultimate goals. The Bali bombings I and II, the J.W. Marriott hotel bombing, and the Australian Embassy bombing showed five important patterns. First, they were carried out by the pro-al-Qaeda faction within AJAI. Second, they are capable of launching spectacular and deadly attacks, as shown by the quality of the bombs they produced and their modus operandi. It is because of them that the governments across Southeast Asia considered AJAI to be the most dangerous terrorist organization in the region. Third, they have no objection to killing non-military westerners. Fourth, they are willing to sacrifice Muslims in pursuit of achieving their goals. Fifth, they show no remorse after killing a large number of people and injuring thousands. Understanding these patterns, one can argue that the pro-al-Qaeda faction within AJAI is likely to produce or even use chemical and biological weapons.

III. AJAI Motivation Regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons

There is no reference in AJAI’s guidelines (PUPJI) regarding the procurement, production, and usage of CBRN as one of the violent methods in achieving the organization’s ultimate goal.[^37^] PUPJI only states that if the emir of AJAI has declared jihad musalah, it is mandatory for all AJAI operatives to grab their weapons and implement their military skills to combat the enemy.[^38^] Moreover, PUPJI does not specify what types of weapons they can or cannot use. Hence, the issue of whether AJAI should produce or even use CBRN is subject to the judgment of the one who issues the jihad call—the emir. Bashir, the current emir of AJAI, was once asked whether the use of CBRN was justified. He responded, “Yes, if necessary. But the Islamic ummah should seek to minimize [the intensity of the fighting]. Allah has said in chapter 8, verse 60 that we should equip ourselves with weapon power [min quwwah wa min ribathil khail]—that is an order—but preferably to scare and not to kill our enemy. The main goal is to scare them.”[^39^]

There are four important points that can be deduced from this statement. First, the statement justifies the use of CBRN “if necessary,” preferably as a way to frighten rather than kill the enemies of Islam. According to AJAI leaders, enemies of Islam are western powers (mainly the U.S.), non-Muslims who strive to damage Islam, and corrupt Muslim leaders. Second, CBRN serves mainly as a deterrent. Third, “chemical and biological weapons (CBW) would be an ideal weapon of choice considering that most attacks with CBW agents would result in limited casualties, but a high level of fear and panic.”[^40^] Fourth, Bashir decides to quote Holy Koran chapter 8, verse 60 as a way to remind other Muslims that it is indeed a religious duty to prepare for a jihad to defend Islam and to prepare with whatever force or power could be mustered as a way to scare the enemies of Islam.[^41^] Therefore, if AJAI leaders consider the possession of CBW as an effective way to scare the enemies, then possession of such weapons is religiously justified. In addition, Bashir’s decision to quote the Holy Koran is religiously savvy. He knows that (pious) Muslims would not dare to challenge the authority and authenticity of the Holy Koran. Moreover, he understands that the word ribathil khail in that verse, which translates to steeds of war, is metaphorical. Multiple esteemed scholars have interpreted those words as any type of equipment, machinery, and weaponry that could be prepared to deter, scare, and repel the enemies of Islam.[^42^] Thus, Bashir was able to present his case with strong backing.

It is widely documented that Bashir accuses western powers (mainly the U.S.) and non-Muslims of plotting and waging war against Muslims.[^43^] Therefore, he claims that he is forced to embark on his defensive jihad against those who he claims are attacking Islam. Considering his position as the emir of AJAI, this implies that AJAI is also embarking on the same mission. Due to his religious background and education, Bashir has justified the use of CBRN to scare the enemies of Islam. However, he is arguably not the head authority when dealing with combat tactics. Yet, the pro-al-Qaeda faction is known for dealing with combat tactics. Bashir has been known for his strong rhetoric but then takes a soft or moderate stance when making a clear decision.[^44^] After all, he is an ideologue, not a military commander.

Military commanders of AJAI and senior operatives, such as Zulkarnaen, Nurdin M. Top, Dulmatin, Umar Patek, and Abu Dujana (captured), are known to have been influenced by bin Laden. For instance, Abu Dujana does not shy away from praising bin Laden and even calling him sheikh (leader).[^45^] Dujana’s high regard for bin Laden further strengthens the argument that many AJAI senior operatives are indeed inclined towards bin Laden when it comes to strategy and combative tactics, yet are inclined towards Bashir when it comes to spiritual matters. Indonesian intelligence also views that the current role of Bashir is as a spiritual leader. The senior operatives, military commanders, and heads of mantiqis are viewed as the ones who run the AJAI.[^46^] Considering that AJAI has been increasingly decentralized and relies more on pro-al-Qaeda leadership (senior operatives, military commanders, and heads of mantiqis), the level of concern has risen that the probability of AJAI producing or using CBW is a possible scenario.

It is also crucial to examine bin Laden’s view regarding CBRN, considering the number of AJAI operatives who look up to bin Laden is growing steadily. Bin Laden mentioned in 1998 that it is indeed a duty for Muslims to possess CBRN.[^47^] Not surprisingly, the statements of both the heads of the salafi jihadist groups are identical. Considering all the similarities between al-Qaeda and AJAI, cooperation between al-Qaeda and AJAI, and especially the pro-al-Qaeda faction within AJAI, production of CBRN is plausible. In fact, it occurred previously in 2000. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (one of the top al-Qaeda operatives) asked Hambali to find a scientist who could lead al-Qaeda’s biological weapons program. Hambali then responded by sending an AJAI operative within his mantiqi, Yazid Sufaat. Soon thereafter, Sufaat began working on an al-Qaeda anthrax program in Afghanistan.[^48^] However, the program was halted due to the U.S. attack on the Taliban.[^49^]

It is interesting to note that despite having Sufaat, who is supposedly a capable scientist, AJAI decided not to start its own CBW programs. Instead, it was al-Qaeda that decided to build a small laboratory in Kandahar and requested Sufaat to work on that laboratory with the aim to produce biological weapons. This could be interpreted in two ways. First, AJAI was not truly motivated in possessing CBW. This is because AJAI could have clandestinely set up an independent laboratory somewhere in Indonesia or the Philippines given the luxury of movement and security that AJAI had at that time. Second, AJAI was not financially capable of supporting its own CBW programs. Taking into consideration that al-Qaeda only supplied Sufaat with less than $4,000 to start CBW programs and inadequate resources, it appears that financial constraints are unlikely to be the real reason.[^50^] One can argue that prior to 2001, AJAI was not motivated to set up CBW programs. Nonetheless, with the finding of the AJAI chemical and biological manual in 2003, one could argue that AJAI’s motivation in producing CBW has increased. Then the question is: Does AJAI’s current motivation or intention match its actual capability?

IV. AJAI’s Capability to Produce or Use CBW

AJAI’s capability to produce and use CBW is relatively low due to four major reasons. First, according to Nasir Abas, one of AJAI’s top military academy instructors, AJAI’s military academies in Afghanistan and the Philippines did not train AJAI operatives on how to produce or use CBW.[^51^] Instead, they trained AJAI operatives on basic military skills such as:[^52^]

1. Infantry tactics
2. Map reading
3. Weapons training (“everything from pistols to automatic rifles, light machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades”)[^53^]
4. Explosives: AJAI operatives learn basic skills relating to mines and bombs. This training section includes the use of ‘actual samples of TNT, black powder, PETN, ammonium nitrate and C4. [AJAI operatives] also work with detonators, detonating cords, blasting caps, and timing devices (alarm clocks). Practical exercises are conducted with 100 grams of explosive material.’[^54^]

Nasir Abas also adds that AJAI operatives who graduated from AJAI’s military academy in Afghanistan and wanted to gain more military skills were sent to an advanced military academy owned by Arab mujahidin in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War.[^55^] In this academy, AJAI operatives learned advanced bomb-making techniques. Additionally, AJAI operatives learned how to construct bombs using various chemical compounds and to formulate poisons using other chemicals. The types of poisons that they were trained in remain unclear. In general, the subjects taught in the Arab mujahidin military academy included:[^57^]

1. Advanced marksmanship
2. Advanced use of pistols and revolvers
3. Advanced bomb-making
4. Firing devices
5. Utilizing combat tanks (such as T-60, T-59, and T-72)
6. Ammunition
7. Commando training

The facts mentioned above show that AJAI operatives’ training barely includes the production and use of chemical weapons and did not cover biological weapons training. Nevertheless, it reveals that AJAI operatives receive a significant amount of training in bomb-making both from their own military academy as well as from the Arab mujahidin military academy. This explains why many AJAI operatives have become experts in bomb-making. The magnitude of destruction and the number of casualties in the Bali bombing in 2002 clearly demonstrated AJAI operatives’ capability to produce sophisticated bombs.

The second reason that AJAI has a relatively low capability to produce or use CBW is that AJAI’s leading scientist, who once led the al-Qaeda biological weapons program, Yazid Sufaat, was captured in 2001 in Malaysia. His capture seriously impeded the progress of the program. The program itself “was still in the early ‘conceptual stage’ when it was cut short by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.”[^58^] Following the invasion, Sufaat planned to move the program to Indonesia. While in Afghanistan, Sufaat failed to obtain a pathogenic strain of anthrax and planned to continue his attempt in Indonesia. Nonetheless, he was captured in Malaysia before he set foot in Indonesia. Afterwards, the U.S. government froze Sufaat’s assets through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), including his company Green Laboratories Medicine, which he used to acquire anthrax and develop biological weapons.[^60^] Soon thereafter, the United Nations Security Council Committee 1267 listed and embargoed him as an affiliate of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.[^61^] Consequently, these international embargoes have made it even more difficult for Sufaat’s subordinates to carry on with their mission to produce biological weapons.

While it is well documented that Sufaat’s program was still in the early ‘conceptual stage,’ there is still a lingering question regarding how far away Sufaat was from producing a sufficient quantity of anthrax to use as a weapon. Bio-warfare experts calculate that “on the eve of 9/11 the program was still at least two to three years away from producing a sufficient quantity of anthrax to use as a weapon.”[^62^] Additionally, to further assess Sufaat’s biological weapons programs, it would be prudent to firstly examine the resources and means that Sufaat had, and secondly, compare those with another group’s biological weapons program. The group that will be used as a comparison is Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic cult that carried out a sarin nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995.[^63^]

Sufaat only holds ‘a bachelor’s degree in biological sciences, with a minor in chemistry from California State University, Sacramento,’ but was in fact the head of the program.[^64^] This implies that the rest of the people who worked under him had lesser knowledge when it came to biological weapons. This fact alone has been a source of humor for many microbiologists and bio-weapons experts. “A simple bachelor’s in biology and a smattering of undergraduate chemistry in no way equips a person to develop a ‘biological weapons program.’”[^65^] While those experts have no doubt about the zeal and determination that Sufaat and others who worked with him had, they argue that “the difficulties for laypeople simply to procure a virulent strain of anthrax are virtually insurmountable—to say nothing of turning them into requisite aerosols.”[^66^] In comparison, Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW program was led by “Dr. Seichi Edo, a molecular biologist with a degree in genetic engineering, genetics, and medicine from the prestigious Kyoto University.”[^67^] In addition, he was supported by a team of no less than 20 graduate-level scientists.[^68^]

Moreover, Sufaat worked in a bio-weapons laboratory for less than a year in a less than adequate laboratory near Kandahar airport. It is worth recalling that Sufaat’s bio-weapons laboratory did not even have running water.[^69^] In comparison, Dr. Edo and his team worked for about four years in state-of-the-art laboratories and used the most advanced equipment.[^70^] Furthermore, Sufaat’s bio-weapons program was extremely low-budgeted, and he received an initial budget of no more than US$4,000.[^71^] Dr. Edo, on the other hand, received no less than US$20 million.[^72^]

Table 1: Comparison of Bio-weapons Efforts by Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaeda/AJAI[^73^]

	Aum Shinrikyo	Al-Qaeda/ AJAI
Number of professionally trained individuals	Approximately 20	1
Total number of individuals	10-12	Few consultants and purchasing assistants
Duration of effort and status of program	1990-1994, including laboratory work	1998(?) to 2001. Sufaat joined only for less than a year; laboratory work had apparently not yet begun
Access to pathogens	None; attempt to obtain failed	Apparently none; attempt to obtain anthrax reportedly failed
Acquisition of equipment	Advance	Minimal, but precise dimensions unknown
Laboratory	State of the art laboratory	Inadequate
Acquisition of Information	300 books	12 books, 20 academic journal papers, additional references
Funds expended	Estimate of US$ 20 million	Initial budget of US$ 2,000-4000

 

Based on the comparison table above, if Aum Shinrikyo failed to kill a single person with a biological weapon despite all the time, money, and resources that it had, then what is the chance that al-Qaeda and AJAI’s biological weapons programs will succeed considering their blatant inadequacies?

The third reason is that the manual that AJAI sees as the key to producing CBW is somewhat inaccurate. In general, the manual explains production and delivery mechanisms for a wide array of chemical substances such as hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide, phosgene, chlorine, and arsenic. While the chemical weapons section of the manual discusses the production of several highly potent agents, it also contains several flaws. For instance, the manual is mistaken about the dosage of hydrogen cyanide. Additionally, the sections on hydrogen sulfide and phosgene are also mistaken regarding delivery systems.[^74^] It is also important to note that “the manual completely omits the category of nerve agents, which are the most potent but also the most difficult to produce.”[^75^]

Furthermore, the biological weapons section of the manual is covered in less detail and is also somewhat inaccurate. The manual focuses mainly on “toxins such as botulinum toxin, nicotine, toxins from poisonous mushrooms, and potato buds.”[^76^] For instance, the manual makes a blatant mistake regarding the dose of botulinum toxin, stating that ‘30 ml of the agent can kill 60 million people, God willing!!!’[^77^] Additionally, the manual explains that castor beans with a removed seed coat, if ground in a blender or coffee grinder with acetone, and then filtered repeatedly through a coffee filter to remove the oil, would make a highly toxic material. According to bio-warfare experts, such a procedure would not produce any dangerous toxic material.[^78^]

The fourth reason is that AJAI is currently in decline. Following the first Bali bombing, the Indonesian government, in cooperation with other states in Southeast Asia, the U.S., and the United Nations, began to crack down hard on AJAI. Individuals connected to AJAI were soon arrested, while the financial assets connected to AJAI were frozen. In addition, AJAI’s military academy and many of its safe houses were raided, leaving the organization incapable of augmenting its combat capability. In brief, AJAI currently faces serious financial, logistical, and operational challenges. As a result, the capability of the organization to start CBW programs is significantly reduced.

The Indonesian government, together with the Malaysian and Singaporean governments, have disrupted AJAI’s main source of income—mantiqi I. Numerous AJAI-run businesses, which contribute 10 percent of their total earnings to the group, were seized. The U.S. also froze various bank accounts that allegedly belong to ten high-ranking members of AJAI through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).[^79^] Additionally, the UN also listed and embargoed AJAI by including the group on the UN Security Council 1267 Committee’s list of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.[^80^] Hence, these current circumstances make it financially more difficult for AJAI to survive, let alone embark on relatively expensive CBW programs.

Furthermore, the governments in Southeast Asia have been successful in penetrating the secretive AJAI and have captured its main operatives. Moreover, the image of AJAI as a shadowy organization has been shattered. Today, more and more AJAI operatives are captured or killed in addition to the fact that many of AJAI’s military commanders were already captured or killed. All in all, the total numbers of AJAI operatives are significantly reduced. Equally important, Indonesian intelligence now closely monitors pesantren and religious institutions, especially those that are located in mantiqi II—AJAI’s recruiting ground. Hence, it would be more difficult for AJAI to indoctrinate moderate Muslims in its radical ideology, let alone recruit more operatives.

Moreover, mantiqi III, which serves as a training location and safe area for AJAI members, has been seriously undermined by the Philippine government. In July 2000, the Philippine government launched a major military offensive against MILF and AJAI. The Philippines also successfully seized AJAI’s main Military Academy Hudaybiyah, forcing the group to set up an interim camp, Jabal Quba, in the dense forests on the boundary of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur provinces.[^81^] Additionally, the Philippine government’s constant suppression has resulted in the capture or death of many important AJAI operatives in the Mindanao area such as Taufik Rifki, Aqil, and al-Ghozi.[^82^]

V. Conclusion

The finding of AJAI’s chemical and biological manual in 2003 has shocked the government officials in Southeast Asia. Given that AJAI is the deadliest terrorist organization in Southeast Asia and that AJAI has been increasingly influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology, AJAI’s control of chemical and biological weapons would logically make this group even more perilous. Furthermore, the emir of AJAI, Bashir, argues that the possession of CBRN is a religious duty for Muslims as a way to deter the enemies of Islam—western powers (mainly the U.S.), non-Muslims, and corrupt Muslim leaders. In-depth examination shows that the pro-al-Qaeda faction within AJAI is the one that is likely to produce or even use CBW.

Nevertheless, the finding of the manual demonstrates intent but not capability. Meticulous examination reveals that AJAI’s capability to produce and use CBW is relatively low due to four major reasons. First, AJAI operatives’ training does not cover the production and use of CBW. Second, AJAI’s leading scientist, who once led the al-Qaeda biological weapons program, Yazid Sufaat, was captured in 2001 in Malaysia. Third, AJAI’s chemical and biological manual, which AJAI sees as the key to producing CBW, is somewhat inaccurate. Fourth, AJAI is currently in decline; AJAI lacks the financial, logistical, and operational means to embark on CBW programs.

In conclusion, although AJAI is motivated to produce CBW, the organization currently does not have sufficient capabilities to produce all the CBW explained in the manual. AJAI perhaps could produce CW using very simple chemical mixtures. However, it would be somewhat futile; the production of simple CW would be unlikely to deter or scare AJAI’s enemies. In addition, AJAI has been successful in carrying out deadly attacks using homemade bombs. Thus, why should AJAI change its modus operandi? It is important to note that an attack using very simple chemical mixtures would only represent a regression and not a progression in terms of the lethality of AJAI’s operations.[^83^]

Disclaimer

This paper was written in 2007-2008. Since then, many changes have occurred, including shifts in the geopolitical landscape and the status of various organizations mentioned. This document is provided solely for educational purposes and may not reflect the most current information or perspectives. The views and analysis presented are based on the author’s understanding and the sources available at the time of writing. The author did not have access to classified information; all research was conducted using publicly available sources. Readers are encouraged to consult more recent sources for updated information and insights.

This content should not be interpreted as an endorsement of any viewpoint or as a comprehensive analysis of current events. The information contained in this paper may not fully capture the complexities of the issues discussed or the developments that have taken place since its writing. The author and publisher disclaim any liability for actions taken based on the information provided in this document.

Endnotes

1. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 280.
2. “Taufik Rifki,” Taufik Rifki–Jemaah Islamiya Financier, Homeland Security, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/taufik_rifki.htm.
3. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 152-57.
4. Eric Schmitt, “Experts See Gains Against Asian Terror Networks,” The New York Times, 9 June 2008.
5. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 119-121; Zachary Abuza, “The State of Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five Years After Bali,” Nov. 2007, The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, http://www.simmons.edu/academics/undergraduate/political-science/docs/abuza_jccts_researchseries_2.11-2007.pdf.
6. Ministry of Home Affairs, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, 6.
7. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 120 and 125.
8. Fact Sheet: Bringing Terrorists to Justice, The United States of America, The White House, 2006.
9. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 126 and 127.
10. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group (2002): 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, 101-107.
13. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, New York: Lynne Rienner, Incorporated, 2003, 129.
14. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 119-121; Zachary Abuza, “The State of Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five Years After Bali,” Nov. 2007, The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, http://www.simmons.edu/academics/undergraduate/political-science/docs/abuza_jccts_researchseries_2.11-2007.pdf.
15. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 125.
16. Ministry of Home Affairs, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, 6.
17. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 120 and 125.
18. Fact Sheet: Bringing Terrorists to Justice, The United States of America, The White House, 2006.
19. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 126 and 127.
20. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group (2002): 1.
21. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 56 and 120.
22. Ibid., 128-130.
23. Ibid., 148-150.
24. Simon Elegant, “Still Going Strong,” 15 Dec. 2003, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,561532,00.html?iid=digg_share.
25. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 120.
26. Ibid., 27-29.
27. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 304 and 305; “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group (2002): 3.
28. Ibid.
29. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 305; “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group (2002): 3.
30. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group (2002): 3.
31. Ibid., 4.
32. “Police to quiz Bali ‘mastermind’,” BBC News, 25 Nov. 2002, 1 Dec. 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2505247.stm; Abu Dujana, “Interview with a Militant,” interview, You Tube, 26 June 2007, CNN Exclusive, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikbduzvijga.
33. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – Indonesia,” interview with Evan Williams, You Tube, Oct. 2002, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwehhlaqdhc.
34. Osama Bin Laden, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, trans. James Howarth, ed. Bruce Lawrence, New York: Verso Books, 2005, 72.
35. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 307 and 308.
36. Two sources: I compare various public statements made by leaders of AJAI and al-Qaeda available on www.youtube.com and on the internet as well as their written statements available on the internet. In addition, I use: Muhammad H. B. Hassan, “Imam Samudra’s Justification for Bali Bombing,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007): 1033-1056.
37. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 101-113.
38. Ibid., 109 and 110.
39. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 284.
40. This is an opinion of Adam Dolnik and Rohan Gunaratna in their article “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 284.
41. Translation of Holy Quran, Translated and Explained by Muhammad Asad. See: The Message of The Quran by Muhammad Asad.
42. Translation of Holy Quran, Translated and Explained by Bachtiar Surin.
43. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – Indonesia,” interview with Evan Williams, You Tube, Oct. 2002, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwehhlaqdhc.
44. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group (2002): 3.
45. Abu Dujana, “Interview with a Militant,” interview, You Tube, 26 June 2007, CNN Exclusive, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikbduzvijga.
46. Raymond Bonner, and Jane Pelez, “THREATS AND RESPONSES: JAKARTA; Indonesia Links Muslim Group With Terrorism,” The New York Times, 17 Oct. 2002, 1 Dec. 2008 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9901e4d7143df934a25753c1a9649c8b63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
47. Osama Bin Laden, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, trans. James Howarth, ed. Bruce Lawrence, New York: Verso Books, 2005, 72.
48. Steven Emerson, Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US, New York: Prometheus Books, 2006, 156.
49. “Is Al Qaeda Making Anthrax?,” CBS News, 9 Oct. 2003, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/09/eveningnews/main577395.shtml.
50. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 291.
51. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 51-134.
52. Ibid., 51 and 52.
53. Simon Elegant, “Still Going Strong,” 15 Dec. 2003, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,561532,00.html?iid=digg_share.
54. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 54.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 133.
58. Tanya O. White, “Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism: Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia,” The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Occasional Paper Series, http://www.uq.edu.au/acpacs/docs/papers/nuclearsecurityogilvie-white.pdf.
59. “Is Al Qaeda Making Anthrax?,” CBS News, 9 Oct. 2003, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/09/eveningnews/main577395.shtml.
60. See Office of Foreign Assets Control List available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20030905.shtml.
61. See The List of Individuals Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consoltablelist.shtml.
62. Bruce Hoffman, “CBRN Terrorism Post-9/11,” 2007, The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, 1 Dec. 2008 http://fletcher.tufts.edu/jebsencenter/researchbriefs/jccts_hoffman_cbrn_01-2007.pdf.
63. Holly Fletcher, “Aum Shinrikyo,” 28 May 2008, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.cfr.org/publication/9238/.
64. Philipp Sarasin, Anthrax: Bioterror as Fact and Fantasy, trans. Giselle Weiss, New York: Harvard UP, 2006, 161-62.
65. Ibid., 162.
66. Ibid.
67. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 291.
68. Ibid.
69. Philipp Sarasin, Anthrax: Bioterror as Fact and Fantasy, trans. Giselle Weiss, New York: Harvard UP, 2006, 162.
70. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 291.
71. Ibid.
72. Andreas Wenger, and Reto Wollenmann, eds. Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat, New York: Lynne Rienner, Incorporated, 2007, 63.
73. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 291; Andreas Wenger, and Reto Wollenmann, eds. Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat, New York: Lynne Rienner, Incorporated, 2007, 63.
74. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 286 and 287.
75. Ibid., 287.
76. Ibid., 287 and 288.
77. Ibid., 288.
78. Ibid.
79. “10 Jemaah Islamiyah Members’ Assets Frozen,” Voice of America, 5 Sept. 2003, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2003-09/a-2003-09-05-17-10.cfm.
80. Fact Sheet: Bringing Terrorists to Justice, The United States of America, The White House, 2006.
81. Jim Gomez, “Report: Militant training camps held for 7 years in Philippines,” 23 Sept. 2004, The San Diego-Union Tribune, 1 Dec. 2008 http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040923/news_1n23filip.html.
82. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyyah, Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007, 154-157.
83. Adam Dolnik, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, by Russell D. Howard, James J. Forest, and Natasha Bajema, New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2007, 292.