Before ISIS: al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (al-Qaeda in Iraq)

I. Introduction

In Osama bin Laden’s own words during his self-requested interview in 1996 with Abdel Bari Atwan, the editor-in-chief of al-Quds al-Arabi, he stated, “We want to bring the Americans to fight us on Muslim land. If we can fight them on our own territory we will beat them, because the battle will be on our terms in a land they neither know nor understand.”1 This, among other statements, shows that Bin Laden was truly aware of his organization’s—al-Qaeda—limitations. He knew that for al-Qaeda to have a chance to win a fight against the giant military superpower America, the battle would have to take place in a land familiar to al-Qaeda but unfamiliar to the United States. Based on literature and publications from al-Qaeda, the organization’s leaders believe that conducting a long-term war of attrition—Harb Istinzaf—in lands relatively unknown to the U.S. (Afghanistan and Iraq) is key to defeating the superpower.2 They calculated that this type of warfare would drain the U.S. economically, militarily, psychologically, and politically, eventually reducing the U.S.’s means and desire to fight and forcing the U.S. to lose its military presence and hegemony in the Middle East.3 However, this calculation, thus far in the case of Afghanistan, is imprecise. Not only were al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and its host the Taliban unable to match the U.S. military superiority (proven by the fact that more than 80 percent of their military capabilities and infrastructure were destroyed), but also some of its leaders were captured or killed. Additionally, the rest of its top leaders were forced into hiding. In brief, although al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is not yet defeated, its activity has become limited and stagnant.4

Nevertheless, the case of Iraq is—to a certain extent—the opposite. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is considered to be “the most formidable U.S. enemy in Iraq.”5 This statement is based on the number of high-profile attacks AQI has perpetrated against targets of the U.S., the UN, the Iraqi government, security forces, and civilians. Moreover, this is based on the scale of tangible damage and casualties that the group has caused in Iraq. More importantly, in recent years, AQI has influenced the violent chaotic sectarian atmosphere in Iraq. Despite the fact that many experts argue that AQI is in decline, especially following the death of its infamous emir, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI is still responsible for 15 percent of the total number of attacks in Iraq, proving that AQI continues to be a force that must be reckoned with and dealt with to stabilize Iraq.6 This paper will start by dissecting AQI starting from its foundation, expansion, and finally its unification with Zarqawi’s group, Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. In addition, this paper will attempt to unravel the relationship between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi as well as the relationship between AQI and Iraqi Sunnis. Lastly, this paper will attempt to analyze from the perspective of the land and location:

• Why is a relatively new AQI able to grow exponentially and “outperform” al-Qaeda in Afghanistan? This will take into account that Afghanistan was once the initial stronghold of al-Qaeda.

II. AQI Foundation

According to Saad al-Faqih, a notable supporter of al-Qaeda who is also the head of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, approximately 300 members of al-Qaeda infiltrated into Iraq in the Sunni Triangle between Baghdad and Mosul a few months before the U.S. invasion.7 According to Saif al-Adl, the overwhelming majority of al-Qaeda operatives, who infiltrated into Iraq in 2003, came from the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and North Africa.8 These members of al-Qaeda were instructed to blend in, establish logistical and network support (especially with Sunni Muslims), and establish ties with Iraqi army personnel ‘with Islamic tendencies.’9 Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, in the area outside Iraqi government control, Zarqawi (who was at this time the leader of Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and had not joined al-Qaeda) realized the U.S. invasion was inevitable and similarly began to establish local support networks in the Sunni Triangle.10 The overwhelming majority of operatives in the Zarqawi network came “from the Bilad al-Sham, or the Fertile Crescent—Jordan, Syria, Palestine, now Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Gulf sheikdoms and North African States.”11

The encounter between al-Qaeda and Tawhid members, coincidently or not, led to some sort of agreement and cooperation between them. Zarqawi and his Tawhid’s group, who arrived in Iraq a year before al-Qaeda and had established considerable contacts and gained local knowledge, consented to facilitate the entry of al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq via Syria.12 The relationship between al-Qaeda and Tawhid was mutually beneficial in terms of “tactical support, publicity, and recruiting purposes.”13 However, “given Tawhid’s superior intelligence-gathering capability, it made little sense for non-Tawhid operatives [including al-Qaeda] to plan and carry out attacks without coordinating with Zarqawi’s lieutenants.”14 For this reason, Tawhid’s leader, Zarqawi, was considered to be the regional emir of the foreign jihadis, even though he would not pledge his bayat to al-Qaeda for another year.15

Zarqawi’s deliberate postponement in joining al-Qaeda was not only caused by his intention to negotiate from a position of strength but also because there were differing views between him and al-Qaeda leaders regarding “the far and near enemy priority.”16 Al-Qaeda leaders wanted to firstly focus on defeating the far enemy—the United States—whom they perceived as a major supporter of the “apostate” Arab regimes and then to settle scores with the regimes—Tasfiyat Hisabat.17 Zarqawi, on the other hand, wanted to firstly focus on defeating the near enemies. Needless to say, he wanted to settle scores with the “apostate” Arab regimes and “renegades,” especially the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian regimes, the (new) Iraqi government, and Shiites.18 More divergently, Zarqawi held a vitriolic view toward Shiite Muslims, whom he perceived as rafida (in this context meaning renegades) and “a sect of treachery and betrayal throughout history.”19 In other words, not only did Zarqawi (a Sunni extremist and takfiri) view Shiite Muslims as religiously fallacious, but he also viewed them as politically and morally treacherous for collaborating with the U.S.—“the infidels” who were occupying Muslim land.20

Before long, he perceived Shiite Muslims as the greatest threat to jihadis because, according to him, they “know jihadis inside and out”; whereas, he perceived the U.S. to be a vulnerable enemy due to its limited knowledge of the land and intelligence networks.21 Therefore, he initially thought that it was necessary to fight the Shiites as a way to penalize them for their collaboration with the U.S. and to force them “to bend into Sunnis” (and later to ignite sectarian violence).22 Al-Qaeda leaders, however, believed that it would be imprudent and counterproductive to combat the majority population of Iraq—Shiite. Although al-Qaeda leaders have no objection to killing Shiites out of necessity, they preferred to see Shiites “be exhorted and enticed to join the larger movement.”23 Considering this, it would seem that al-Qaeda leaders’ rationales “were more tactical and strategic than ideological.”24

III. Al-Qaeda Expansion and Unification

An equally important point to note is that “the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its subsequent intimate relationship with the new Iraqi government conflated the near and far enemy.”25 In other words, the presence and dominance of both far and near enemies in one land had provided Tawhid and al-Qaeda with a common ground for agreement, cooperation, and finally unification. In addition, both groups are quintessentially similar, because both groups advocate Salafism and pan-Islamism.26 Moreover, since Tawhid was relatively successful in its attempt to destabilize Iraq through its high-profile attacks and its effective use of media propaganda, the coalition forces began to switch their focus to defeating Tawhid. Before long, Zarqawi and his fighters realized that they were facing growing pressure from the coalition forces throughout Iraq, including in their own base of operations in Fallujah.27 Although fearsome, Tawhid was lacking in manpower. Tawhid numerically made up a tiny proportion of the resistance (estimates run from 50 to 500), making even a single casualty truly devastating.28 Hence, Tawhid’s leader, Zarqawi—as a rational actor—knew that unification with other substantial groups with similar sets of beliefs such as al-Qaeda would be imperative to ensure not only his group’s survival but also the continuation of its struggle. In October of 2004, after a year of cooperation and negotiation, Zarqawi finally pledged his bayat to Osama bin Laden.29 This meant that Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad would fight under the banner of al-Qaeda and call itself al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (a.k.a al-Qaeda in Iraq).30 This unification undoubtedly caused significant outcomes that Zarqawi had hoped for. Zarqawi’s growing reputation as the emir of the foreign jihadis in Iraq combined with a well-known jihadis global network (i.e., al-Qaeda) had not only increased the legitimacy of AQI and Zarqawi but also had boosted the flowing human, financial, and logistical resources from various places to AQI, which, in turn, exponentially strengthened AQI.31 Al-Qaeda also benefited overall from this unification. Not only did al-Qaeda expand its size and network, but it also allowed al-Qaeda to “take credit for Zarqawi’s successes and rejuvenate [its] battered base.”32 It is also important to note that al-Qaeda leaders strive to broaden their network’s appeal to Arab and Muslim populations, especially to those who feel angry about the U.S. occupation of Iraq—a pivotal Muslim state. The U.S. occupation of Iraq is not only being used by al-Qaeda leaders to justify their claim that the U.S. is indeed the enemy of Islam but also to justify their claim that the U.S. is a selfish, capitalist country that will do anything to secure its access to the world’s vital resources (in this case oil) even if it means invading a sovereign state. By positioning themselves as protectors of Arab and Muslim lands, al-Qaeda leaders are hoping to garner public support for their global struggle against “the great Satan.”33

Nonetheless, as a corollary of Zarqawi’s bayat, he was obliged to obey the instructions of the al-Qaeda leadership. Henceforth, he was no longer a singular autonomous entity responsible only to the group that he led. Even so, al-Qaeda leaders knew that since they were not in the field, they were not aware of all the details in Iraq. For that reason, they entrusted Zarqawi with carrying out all strategies that he perceived essential to defeat and expel the far enemy.34 Zarqawi thought that by consistently attacking the majority Shiites, it would provoke a brutal retaliation from Shiites against the minority Sunni and this would lead to a bloody sectarian war.35 Not only did Zarqawi believe that a sectarian war would make Iraq ungovernable even for the U.S., but he also believed that a sectarian war would expand the jihad in the region by bringing mujahedin from neighboring countries to help Sunnis in their effort to defeat the Shiites and the United States.36 By making Iraq ungovernable for the U.S., undoubtedly, it would not only force the U.S. to incur more financial resources, military personnel, and political will, but also it would prolong the war—Harb Istinzaf.

In the meantime, al-Qaeda leaders would act as observers and, if necessary, would intervene or “correct” any AQI action that they considered to be counterproductive and defeat the purpose (e.g., media beheading hostages, attacking Shiite mosques, and the Imam Ali’s mausoleum) and thereby, alienating and upsetting popular support (umma) and ulama.37 For bin Laden and Zawahiri, one of the most important battles is that of “a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of umma.”38 For them, it is imperative to ensure the continuous support of umma. And any action that could alienate umma would be completely inadvisable. Although al-Qaeda leaders are for creating a Harb Istinzaf against the U.S., they were not entirely satisfied with Zarqawi’s methods to bring that about, which was also alienating the umma, and thereby, reducing support for the al-Qaeda cause. For instance, when AQI was involved in its media beheading hostages, attacking Shiite mosques, and at worst attacking the Imam Ali’s mausoleum, Zawahiri (al-Qaeda’s second-in-command) purposely sent a letter to Zarqawi advising him to stop.39

IV. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Iraqi Sunnis

Although the unification of Tawhid and al-Qaeda had increased the number of their operatives, AQI still did not have sufficient manpower (less than 2000) to triumph in Iraq.40 For that reason, AQI has continued to put emphasis on expanding its network support and making political alliances with various anti-U.S. and anti-Shiite movements in Iraq, among whom are disgruntled Sunnis. After all, AQI is comprised of Sunni-Salafi militias. In fact, AQI takes advantage of some Iraqi Sunnis nationalists who feel angry and alienated because the U.S. occupation marked the end of their minority rule over Iraq as well as marked the end of their employment term.41 Although the exact extent of cooperation between AQI and Iraqi nationalist groups is unknown, there was a joint declaration published in November of 2004 by various Iraqi nationalist groups, the Ba’th party, and the AQI proclaiming their intent to intensify their armed attacks against coalition forces.42

Sunnis’ uneasiness toward the U.S. occupation, the Shiite-dominated government, the increase of Iran’s influence in Iraq, and the presence of Shiite militias in their neighborhood (such as Badr Brigade or Mahdi Army) has influenced their behaviors. They, as a minority, began to look for external assistance or at least to consolidate with other Sunni elements in Iraq.43 For Sunni Islamist groups, the U.S. occupation and Shiite-dominated government are politically and religiously wrong. For this reason, they have sought to re-establish Sunni rule over Iraq. However, the current unfavorable situation in Iraq leaves them with few options—either to abandon the armed struggle and use diplomacy as a tactic with tremendous odds against them, to conduct a solo fight with the chance of getting annihilated, or possibly to build a coalition with other substantial movements in Iraq with similar sets of beliefs such as the AQI or Ansar al-Sunna to improve their chance of success. In fact, various Sunni Salafi groups chose the last option and—together with AQI—formed a coalition called Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC).44 This coalition later expanded to several Sunni tribal chiefs and changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq.45 Indubitably, this coalition has expanded the logistical and network support of its members, especially AQI, which, in turn, has strengthened its own sphere of influence. Additionally, AQI often collaborates with Ansar al-Sunna in their effort to expel the occupying forces.46

V. Analysis on AQI from the Perspective of Land and Location

From the perspective of land and location, overall, Iraq provides a more conducive base for al-Qaeda than Afghanistan. And from the same perspective, the reason why AQI is able to grow exponentially and “outperform” the al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan is due to three major reasons. First, Iraq, by and large, is an Arab state. Hence, Iraq provides an Arabic-speaking atmosphere that enables AQI, whose members (comprised of both locals and foreigners) are predominantly Arabs to cooperate with various anti-U.S. movements within Iraq such as various Sunni Islamist factions, Arab nationalists, and local Sunni tribes.47 In contrast, this Arabic-speaking atmosphere barely exists in Afghanistan, where the majority of its population does not speak Arabic. Furthermore, Iraq is a state composed predominantly of Arabs, which not only enables foreign Arab jihadi members of AQI to integrate into the population but also enables them to perform all sorts of reconnaissance, infiltration, and incursion (mainly suicide attacks) operations with less difficulty. This is primarily because the differences in physical features between the majority of Iraqi people and Arab jihadis are minimal compared to Afghans. In addition, the AQI members’ integration into the population undoubtedly makes it harder to eradicate than if the al-Qaeda’s members were in Afghanistan.48 “In Afghanistan, American leaders could launch missile strikes against al-Qaeda training bases and U.S. Special Forces could target those camps with or without indigenous help. Not so in Iraq.”49 Moreover, given the fact that “AQI maintains no large training areas and thus no longer offers few targets suitable for missile strikes.”50

Second, geographically Iraq is located in the heart of the Middle East. It borders five Arab states and Iran, which enables the influx of foreign jihadis through its porous borders.51 Despite the fact that most members of AQI are Iraqis, foreign jihadis (who originated from the states surrounding Iraq and its proximity, i.e., Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt) are dominant in leadership positions (i.e., operational nucleus).52 For example, Zarqawi, a former leader of AQI, was Jordanian. His successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is an Egyptian.53 An important point to note is that one of the AQI’s most deadly weapons is its suicide bombers.54 Statistically, AQI has been responsible for 80 to 90 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq.55 The majority of the suicide bombers are foreign jihadis from states surrounding Iraq (mostly from Saudi Arabia).56 These jihadis infiltrate into Iraq from its porous borders in the pursuit of martyrdom.57

As Marc Sageman argued in his book, Understanding Terror Network, suicide bombers are not “impoverished, voiceless dupes tricked into killing themselves.” Rather, they are people who are “politically and religiously motivated.”58 People who live in the states surrounding Iraq are (arguably) more politically and religiously motivated in comparison with the people who live in the states surrounding Afghanistan. Iraq is surrounded by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Turkey, and Iran. While Afghanistan, on the other hand, is surrounded by China, Iran, Pakistan, and three not-so-strict Islamic states such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Needless to say, people who live in the states surrounding Afghanistan, with the exception of Pakistan, are less politically and religiously motivated to infiltrate into Afghanistan to commit politically and religiously motivated suicide attacks relative to people who live in the states surrounding Iraq. (For non-religious Chinese or Buddhists and Iranian Shiites turning themselves into suicide bombers, and, in turn, helping the struggle of Sunni Salafi-jihadis in Afghanistan, i.e., al-Qaeda and the Taliban, simply do not fit into their political and religious interests.) This is proven by the fact that the influx of foreign suicide bombers coming into Iraq is higher and relatively better distributed among Iraq’s neighboring states in comparison with relatively lower numbers of foreign suicide bombers coming into Afghanistan from its neighboring states. In fact, foreign suicide bombers in Afghanistan come almost exclusively from Pakistan.59

Third, and perhaps the most important reason why AQI is able to grow exponentially within a relatively short time is that Iraq has been a pivotal and emotional state not only for Salafi-jihadis (such as AQI) but also for the Muslim umma in general. After all, it was the seat of the Islamic caliphate for 500 years, during which the Islamic civilization once triumphed.60 Afghanistan, on the other hand, holds insignificant historical and spiritual values for the Muslim umma, in general, compared to Iraq. Considering this, the U.S. presence in an important Muslim land, especially after it was proven that the very reason for its presence was based on inaccurate intelligence information, has provoked many zealous Muslims from both local and foreign states to embark on jihad missions.61 Some of these jihadis were not initially affiliated with al-Qaeda, but they eventually responded to an inflammatory call for defensive jihad to drive out “the new Mongol infidel occupation” preached by al-Qaeda leaders and Zarqawi.62 It is also important to note that two prominent Muslim scholars, Sheikh Tantawi of Al-Azhar and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, who disagree with al-Qaeda leaders on many pressing issues, decided to take a similar position with al-Qaeda leaders’ vis-à-vis the U.S. occupation of Iraq. They both issued fatwas arguing “fighting American troops in Iraq is legal jihad,” advising “all Muslims in the world to make jihad against invading American forces in Iraq,” and stating that “death while defending Iraq is a kind of martyrdom.”63 For these reasons, some zealous (again, religiously motivated) Muslims, who listened to their call, decided to infiltrate into Iraq and end up being recruited by AQI.64 In brief, the U.S. invasion of Iraq (one of the most important states for Muslims) has created a conducive recruiting, training, and possibly breeding ground for al-Qaeda and any other jihadi group or individual seeking action.65

VI. Conclusion

From the discussion above, it follows that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has managed to shift the epicenter of the “holy war” from Afghanistan to Iraq. For al-Qaeda, the U.S. invasion of Iraq represented an opportunity to redeem its failure in Afghanistan and to mobilize the umma in the belief that the U.S. is truly the enemy of Islam. Infiltrating 300 members into Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion was a real sign that al-Qaeda was looking forward to facing the U.S. on this new battlefield. This new battlefield was seen as favorable to al-Qaeda. The leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, perceived that the key to defeating the U.S. was to force them into fighting in relatively unfamiliar land and to conduct a long-term war of attrition. Although many experts do not believe that the war in Iraq has become a war of attrition for the U.S., they do not deny the possibility that this war might turn into one.

Of equal importance, Iraq is in many aspects a more conducive base for al-Qaeda than Afghanistan. Iraq, by and large, is an Arab state. Thus, Iraq provides an Arabic-speaking environment and culture that enables AQI, whose members (comprised of both locals and foreigners) are predominantly Arabs to cooperate with other various anti-U.S. movements within Iraq. By the same token, since Iraq is a state that is composed predominantly of Arabs, it enables foreign Arab jihadi members of AQI to integrate into the population; thus, making it very difficult for the U.S. to root them out. Moreover, geographically, Iraq is located in the heart of the Middle East, which enables the influx of foreign jihadis through its porous borders. Lastly, in Islamic terms, Iraq has been a pivotal and emotional state not only for Salafi-jihadis (such as AQI) but also for the Muslim umma in general.

Al-Qaeda’s relationship with Zarqawi was truly unique and often misunderstood. The U.S. occupation and Shiite-dominated government had significantly reduced their diverging views regarding the far and near enemy priority. Thus, this condition provided them with a common ground for cooperation and later unification. It is also important to note that both al-Qaeda and Zarqawi shared similar beliefs of Salafism and pan-Islamism. Zarqawi began his cooperation with al-Qaeda by facilitating al-Qaeda operatives’ entrance into Iraq. His well-established intelligence-gathering capabilities and his ability to orchestrate complex attacks had prompted him to become the emir of the foreign jihadis. He continued to maintain autonomy until October 2004, when he decided to join al-Qaeda. As a rational actor, he believed that unification with a larger and more experienced movement such as al-Qaeda was imperative to ensure the continuation and the success of his efforts. Indeed, joining al-Qaeda allowed him to receive a boost of legitimacy and with it came a windfall of human, financial, and logistical resources. To further strengthen AQI, Zarqawi believed that forging alliances with other anti-U.S. and anti-Shiite movements, especially from disgruntled and alienated Sunnis (both Islamist and nationalist), was also imperative. An important point to note is that despite joining al-Qaeda, Zarqawi maintained some sort of autonomy over strategy in Iraq due to the fact that al-Qaeda leaders maintained only limited awareness of the situation on the ground. Al-Qaeda leaders would act as observers and, if necessary, would intervene or “correct” any AQI action that they considered to be counterproductive or that would alienate the Muslims umma.

Although Zarqawi has been killed, the war against AQI is neither won nor lost. It is true that AQI is declining. Through cooperation with Sunni tribal leaders and effective counter-insurgency tactics, the U.S. has been able to outmaneuver and unseat the AQI from its safe areas. Yet, to simply declare a victory over AQI, as Nuri al-Maliki has claimed, would be premature.66 It takes the AQI only a couple of high-profile attacks and effective use of media propaganda to bring all the efforts back to square one.67 Militarily, the AQI, like any other insurgent group, wins by not losing. That is to say, the AQI does not need to defeat the U.S., but simply to outlive the U.S. presence in Iraq. It is important to keep in mind that patience has always been one of the main weapons in the al-Qaeda arsenal. Hence, failure to acknowledge the continuous threat posed by religiously motivated and capable groups such as the AQI is simply a recipe for disaster. For AQI members, there is no such thing as abandoning jihad; it is either die in battle or live for another battle. Or, in the eloquence of Zarqawi, “It is either dignity or the coffin.”68

Disclaimer

This paper was written in 2007-2008. Many things have changed since then, including the geopolitical landscape and the status of various organizations mentioned. This document is provided solely for educational purposes and may not reflect the most current information or perspectives. The views and analysis presented are based on the author’s understanding and sources available at the time of writing. All research was conducted using publicly available sources. Readers are encouraged to consult more recent sources for updated information and insights. The content should not be interpreted as an endorsement of any viewpoint or as a comprehensive analysis of current events.

End Notes

1. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 179. ↩
2. This statement is based on three separate sources. First, Sammy Salama and David Wheeler, “From the Horse’s Mouth: Unraveling Al-Qa`ida’s Target Selection Calculus,” The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, source. Second, Mywire, “Bin Laden vows war of ‘attrition’ against US until it’s ‘bankrupt’: website,” Mywire, November 1, 2004, source. Third, Michael Scheuer, “Al-Qaeda’s Insurgency Doctrine: Aiming for a “Long War”,” Global Terrorism Analysis, no.8 (2006): 5. source. ↩
3. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sammy Salama, November 21, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. ↩
4. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 180. ↩
5. Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here,” Washington Post, March 18, 2007, source. ↩
6. Andrew Tilghman, “The Myth of AQI,” The Washington Monthly, October 2007, source. ↩
7. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 190. ↩
8. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Cambridge University Press), 254. ↩
9. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 190. ↩
10. Ibid., 197. ↩
11. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Cambridge University Press), 254. ↩
12. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 198. ↩
13. Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, no.29:4 (2006): 19. source. ↩
14. Christopher Heffelfinger, ed., Unmasking Terror (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2005), 176. ↩
15. Ibid. ↩
16. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 205. Second, Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, no.29:4 (2006): 20. source. ↩
17. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, no.29:4 (2006): 20. source. Second, Sammy Salama and David Wheeler, “From the Horse’s Mouth: Unraveling Al-Qa`ida’s Target Selection Calculus,” The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, source. ↩
18. Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, no.29:4 (2006): 20-23. source. ↩
19. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, Murad Al-shishani, “Al-Zarqawi’s Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets,” Global Terrorism Analysis, no.22 (2005): 2. source. Second, see Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, letter released by the Coalition Provisional Authority, February 12, 2004 source. ↩
20. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 216 & 217. ↩
21. See Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, letter released by the Coalition Provisional Authority, February 12, 2004 source. ↩
22. This statement is based on three separate sources. First, Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, no.29:4 (2006): 23. source. Second, see Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, letter released by the Coalition Provisional Authority, February 12, 2004 source. Third, Greg Bruno, “Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia),” Washington Post, November 19, 2007, source. ↩
23. Frederick W. Kagan, “Al Qaeda In Iraq,” The Weekly Standard, September 10, 2007, source. ↩
24. Ibid. ↩
25. Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly, no.29:4 (2006): 21. source. ↩
26. Islamist Terrorist Groups in the Arab World. Jeffrey M. Bale. November 27, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. ↩
27. Christopher Heffelfinger, ed., Unmasking Terror (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2005), 185. ↩
28. Ibid., 184. ↩
29. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 205. ↩
30. Ibid. ↩
31. Timothy A. Kraner, “AL QAEDA IN IRAQ: DEMOBILIZING THE THREAT” (Master Thesis., NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 2005), 44. ↩
32. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sammy Salama, November 21, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. Second, Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Cambridge University Press), 258 and 259. ↩
33. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Cambridge University Press), 259. ↩
34. See Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi. Translated version of a letter between two senior al Qa’ida leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, that was obtained during counterterrorism operations in Iraq. The letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi is dated July 9, 2005. The contents were released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on October 11, 2005. source. ↩
35. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 216. ↩
36. This statement is based on two separate sources. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 217. Second, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sammy Salama, November 21, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. ↩
37. See Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi. Translated version of a letter between two senior al Qa’ida leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, that was obtained during counterterrorism operations in Iraq. The letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi is dated July 9, 2005. The contents were released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on October 11, 2005. source. ↩
38. Ibid. ↩
39. Ibid. ↩
40. Andrew Tilghman, “The Myth of AQI,” The Washington Monthly, October 2007, source. ↩
41. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, Dan Murphy, “How Al Qaeda views a long Iraq war,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 06, 2006, source. Second, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sammy Salama, November 21, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. ↩
42. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 207. ↩
43. Frederick W. Kagan, “Al Qaeda In Iraq,” The Weekly Standard, September 10, 2007, source. ↩
44. Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), “Group Profile: Mujahideen Shura Council,” Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DeticaDFI, RAND Corporation, Dr. Brent Smith (University of Arkansas), and Dr. Kelly Damphousse (KayTen Research and Development, LLC) direct the American Terrorism Study, source. ↩
45. Ibid. ↩
46. Other Sunni Insurgent Groups, Sammy Salama, December 5, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. ↩
47. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 216. ↩
48. Frederick W. Kagan, “Al Qaeda In Iraq,” The Weekly Standard, September 10, 2007, source. ↩
49. Ibid. ↩
50. Ibid. ↩
51. Nicholas Blanford and Dan Murphy, “For Al Qaeda, Iraq may be the next battlefield,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 25, 2003, source. ↩
52. Frederick W. Kagan, “Al Qaeda In Iraq,” The Weekly Standard, September 10, 2007, source. ↩
53. Ibid. ↩
54. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, source. Second, Jessica Bernstein-Wax, “Studies: Suicide bombers in Iraq are mostly foreigners,” McClatchy Newspapers, August 8, 2007, source. ↩
55. Greg Bruno, “Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia),” Washington Post, November 19, 2007, source. ↩
56. Jessica Bernstein-Wax, “Studies: Suicide bombers in Iraq are mostly foreigners,” McClatchy Newspapers, August 8, 2007, source. ↩
57. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 100. ↩
58. Brian Glyn Williams, “The world’s worst suicide bombers,” Asia Times, July 25, 2007, source. ↩
59. This statement is based on four sources. First, Omid Marzban, “The Foreign Makeup of Afghan Suicide Bombers,” Global Terrorism Analysis, no.7 (2006): 1. source. Second, Jessica Bernstein-Wax, “Studies: Suicide bombers in Iraq are mostly foreigners,” McClatchy Newspapers, August 8, 2007, source. Third, see a 140-page study entitled Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007) by The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 1 September 2007. source. Fourth, Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 102 and 103. ↩
60. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 224. ↩
61. Ibid., 218. ↩
62. This statement is based on two separate sources. First, Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody else’s civil war,” The Evatt Foundation, The Evatt Foundation, source. Second, Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 206. ↩
63. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Cambridge University Press), 272. ↩
64. This statement is based on three separate sources. First, Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 206. Second, Dana Priest. “Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground,” Washington Post, January 14, 2005, source. Third, Paul Reynolds. Iraq war ‘helped al-Qaeda recruit’. BBC News, October 19, 2004, source. ↩
65. This statement is based on three separate sources. First, Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 216. Second, Dana Priest. “Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground,” Washington Post, January 14, 2005, source. Third, Paul Reynolds. Iraq war ‘helped al-Qaeda recruit’. BBC News, October 19, 2004, source. ↩
66. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sammy Salama, November 21, 2007, Class Lecture, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey. ↩
67. Ibid. ↩
68. Romesh Ratnesar, Scott MacLeod, Saad Hattar, Bruce Crumley, Timothy J. Burger, “Face Of Terror,” Time, December 19, 2004, source. ↩