Conventional wisdom in international relations avers that security concerns are the primary motivation for states to seek nuclear weapons. That is, “states seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain non-nuclear states.”It is indeed difficult to refute that states are motivated to seek (and willing to go through the arduous, complex, and costly steps) the production of nuclear weapons in order to ensure the most important of their raison d’état—security. Of equal importance, history has shown that the predominant decisions to go nuclear (starting from the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) appear to be motivated by security concerns. Consequently, the security model (i.e., realism theory) has often been presented as the explanation behind a state’s decision to procure nuclear weapons.
So, the question is: Are security concerns the primary motivation for states to seek nuclear weapons (and by extension, other weapons of mass destruction)? Let’s look at the cases for the following countries.
India
India and China had a vitriolic relationship in the early 60s. They went to war in 1962, resulting in an Indian defeat, including the loss of territory to China, and the possibility of future conflict caused by retaliation or border dispute. Two years later, in 1964, China successfully tested its nuclear weapon, proclaiming its military superiority in both conventional and unconventional weapons, and thereby putting India’s security at risk. If security concerns are the primary motivation for states to seek nuclear weapons, it should follow that India—a state with advanced nuclear capabilities and currently under an existential security threat—would embark on a crash weapons program. Nonetheless, history shows that India chose not to do so; the weapons program was delayed due to discrepancies among elite decision-makers in the state machinery.
Ten years later, in 1974, when China no longer posed a serious threat to India’s security, India detonated its first nuclear bomb. It’s important to note that neither Indian military personnel nor the Defense Minister were involved in the initial decision to prepare the nuclear device or the final decision to test the bomb. Normally, if security concerns were the primary motivation, the military would play a significant role in the creation, testing, and storage of nuclear weapons. This arguably indicates that the security issue was of “secondary importance.” More importantly, domestic support for India’s leader at the time, Indira Gandhi, had fallen to an all-time low. Hence, she needed to initiate a spectacular event “to divert public attention from her domestic woes” and to bolster her domestic support. She believed nothing would work better than detonating a nuclear bomb, given the contemporary trend that associates possessing nuclear weapons with modernity and prestige. This, she thought, could be used to restore the nation’s support, confidence, and pride.
South Africa
When Cuban military forces, backed by the Soviet Union—a nuclear power—intervened in Angola in 1975, the South African government felt its security was at risk. “Six atomic weapons were therefore constructed between 1980 and 1989.” At first glance, South Africa’s motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons appears to be ensuring its security, considering the bombs could serve as a deterrent against the Soviet Union. However, further scrutiny reveals that South Africa’s nuclear program began in 1971, four years before the Cuban military’s intervention and the emergence of the (supposed) threat.
Despite having no significant security threats in 1971, South Africa decided to start researching nuclear devices. The country’s decision to embark on a nuclear program was motivated by a desire for prestige and international standing. Specifically, South African scientists aimed to enhance their standing in international scientific circles by successfully producing peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for use in mining situations. It is important to highlight that the mining industry in South Africa has been one of the most important and profitable, with a powerful lobby in the government.
The pursuit of prestige, backed by a coalition of elites within the South African government and mining industry, made the nuclear weapons program not only technologically feasible but also politically and economically viable. It is also worth noting that when South Africa successfully produced its first nuclear device, the device was “too large to be deliverable by military aircraft.” This occurred because the military was not consulted about the bomb design, reinforcing the notion that the South African nuclear weapons program was motivated not by external security threats but by domestic motivations.
Furthermore, South Africa’s decision to relinquish its entire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, including the abandonment of Project Coast—a clandestine biological and chemical weapons program—reinforces the idea that security was not the primary motivation behind South Africa’s WMD program. Considering WMDs could guarantee the current and future security of South Africa, voluntarily giving up its WMD program seems illogical and shortsighted if security were the primary concern. This decision suggests that security concerns and a policy of deterrence against the Soviet Union were never the main drivers of South Africa’s WMD program; they were merely used as justifications.
France
During the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union threatened to use nuclear force against France if it did not withdraw from Egypt, which was the Soviet Union’s (uneasy) ally. This threat was compounded by the fact that the United States’ nuclear guarantee was seen as unreliable, considering the Soviet Union’s second-strike capability. Additionally, the United States had a differing stance from France on the Suez Crisis and demanded France’s withdrawal. It would seem logical, therefore, for France to initiate a weapons program, given its technological, economic, and political capabilities to do so. At this juncture, it could be argued that security concerns were the primary motivation for France to seek nuclear weapons.
However, further examination reveals that this rationale might be fragile. France had already decided to initiate its weapons program two years before the Suez Crisis—two years before the Soviet Union threatened nuclear force. Moreover, if the argument is that the Soviet Union posed a significant danger to France’s security, and the United States provided an unreliable security guarantee to all countries in Europe (including France), then why was France the only country to initiate a weapons program? Why didn’t other nuclear-capable states in Europe, facing similar security threats at the time, also develop nuclear weapons? This suggests that only French leaders highly valued nuclear weapons (relative to other European leaders) and regarded their symbolic significance.
In retrospect, despite emerging victorious in World War II, France was considered a liberated victor with military capabilities and international standing that were relatively modest, especially when compared to other victors like the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain (a rival of France). French leaders were keen on restoring national greatness and international prominence. This ambition was underscored in the First French Five-Year Plan, which emphasized the need to ensure France would remain an influential country in a decade. Essentially, reviving the nation’s grandeur and regaining international respect and prestige were the primary motivations for France’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Much like siege cannons in the medieval era, which were symbols of status and scientific breakthroughs desired by all kings for their arsenals, French leaders viewed nuclear weapons as the contemporary emblem of power, prestige, and scientific expertise. For France to reclaim its international stature in the modern world, it was deemed indispensable for the country to possess nuclear weapons. This imperative was intensified by the observation that existing nuclear powers continued to advance their nuclear capabilities, further widening the gap between the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots,’ with France falling into the latter category. French leaders were determined not to let France fall behind. Moreover, all nuclear powers were actively enhancing their arsenals, adding to the prestige associated with possessing substantial nuclear stockpiles. Thus, having extensive nuclear arsenals became a hallmark of great powers. If France aspired to be recognized as a legitimate great power, it, too, needed nuclear arsenals.
The new institutionalism literature posits that modern institutions often emulate one another, and France followed suit in mimicking other great powers regarding nuclear armament. It’s also noteworthy that, excluding China, France was the only major Western power on the Security Council that lacked nuclear weapons at that time. Therefore, for France to be considered among the elite ‘big boys,’ its strategic nuclear force, the force de frappe, required nuclear capabilities.
In summary, the drive behind France’s development of nuclear weapons was not predominantly rooted in security concerns. The perceived threats from the Soviet Union’s conventional and unconventional forces and doubts about the U.S. security guarantee were merely part of a series of justifications, not the core reason for initiating a nuclear program. Instead, the primary motivation lay in restoring the nation’s grandeur and enhancing its prestige on the international stage.
Final Thoughts and Lessons for Indonesia
All the case studies above demonstrate that security concerns are not always the primary motivation for states to seek nuclear weapons. There are also other motivations that could surpass security motivation in influencing states’ decision to seek nuclear weapons. India’s case illustrates that security threat from China would not necessarily turned into triggering mechanism for a policy change vis-à-vis the decision to seek nuclear weapons. Instead, domestic political considerations turned out to be the primary motivation.
South Africa’s case underlines that obtaining international standing and advancing mining industry are the primary motivation, while the communist presence in Angola served as false justification.
France’s case illuminates that restoring national grandeur and regaining prestige in the international community were France’s post-World War II raison d’état. Without a closer look at France’s domestic documents and pronouncements, and without knowing the fact that France had already started its nuclear program two years before the Suez Crisis, one could be misled to believe that SU’s threat to use nuclear forces against France was the catalyst for France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons.
All in all, the security model’s cogency in explaining the primary motivation for states to seek nuclear weapons is not always tenable. The security model, like any other model, has its weakness; it (overly) focuses on the state level. Hence, it fails to look at the micro level—the intents and roles of elite decision-makers as well as the domestic mood and political considerations.
As a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Indonesia has agreed to forgo nuclear weapons since 1979. And as signatory that has ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol in 1999 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2012, Indonesia has unequivocally continued to cement its status as an upstanding member of the international nonproliferation regime.
In addition, Indonesia is routinely the coordinator of disarmament of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NAM), which constitutes over half of the states parties to the NPT, thereby making Indonesia not only an important member of the NPT, but also palpably a staunch advocate of nuclear-free world. As such, it is inconceivable for Indonesia to try to develop nuclear weapons, since it would mean breaking various international nonproliferation treaties and regimes, and, more importantly, tarnishing its long-standing international reputation and image.
In other words, it is almost guaranteed that, ceteris paribus, Indonesia will continue to play a leadership role in realizing the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Moreover, an Indonesian diplomat once stated that even with the collapse of international nonproliferation treaties and regimes, it does not mean Indonesia would begin a crash nuclear weapons program. He added that Indonesia would be more likely abide by preexisting international nonproliferation norms and would remain non-nuclear.
Still, there are possible scenarios, albeit remote, that may influence Indonesia to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, if anything, previous discussions have lucidly expounded that there are several reasons why states decide to seek nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it is possible that one day Indonesia decides to go nuclear due to security threats, domestic considerations, desire to show its dominance in the region, or to simply join the “big boys.”
Whichever the reason may be, it is crucial for the Indonesian government to understand completely the accompanying risks of embarking on such program, that may well range from international condemnation, to significant loss of international standing, to various sanctions levied by the international community, to risking the state turning into a pariah state, to raising the security tensions in the region, to precipitating a regional arms race, and to being attacked by other states.
